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Large family-owned conglomerates known as zaibatsu have long been 
credited with leading Japanese industrialization during the Meiji Period (1868-
1912), despite a lack of empirical analysis.  I develop a new dataset collected from 
corporate genealogies and estimate the likelihood of a firm being an industry pioneer 
with discrete choice econometric methods.  I find that certain characteristics 
associated with zaibatsu increase the likelihood of leading entry into new industries.  
In particular, first entry probabilities increase with industry diversification and 
private ownership, which may provide internal financing and risk-sharing.  
Nevertheless, the costs of excessive diversification may deter additional pioneering, 
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I 
Japan's rapid industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century is 
commonly attributed to the leadership of large, family-owned conglomerates known 
as zaibatsu.  These firms had the advantages of size, which gave them sufficient 
scale to adopt capital-intensive technology; family ownership, which conferred 
autonomy from shareholders seeking short-term profit; diversified holdings, which 
spread risk and allowed for internal financing of investments; employment of well-
educated salaried managers; and access to natural resources like metals and coal.2  
The benefits of these features were especially magnified in Japan during the Meiji 
Period (1868-1912), which shared with other late developing economies weak 
institutions, poor infrastructure, and immature capital markets.3  Consequently, it 
has been argued that these business groups ``[provided] the impetus to the country's 
modern economic development,'' without which Japanese success would not have 
been nearly as rapid or assured.4 
Belying these apparent advantages, however, are a number of uncomfortable 
observations.  First, Japanese industries were primarily labor-intensive during this 
period, with the economy transitioning to heavier sectors starting in the 1900s. This 
suggests that zaibatsu had few opportunities to exploit scale economies, especially 
given that many of their holdings were commercial (for example, shipping, 
merchandising). While commerce did allow for economies of scope, the attributes of 
size and wealth are less meaningful.  Scope economies differ from scale economies in 
their reliance on the savings from fixed costs (for example, shared facilities, 
distribution channels) rather than variable costs (for example, shared inputs, 
learning curves).  Another way of distinguishing the two is that scope economies 
typically involve production of multiple, unrelated goods while scale economies are 
usually from increased production of the same (or similar) goods.} Second, despite 
their substantial wealth, zaibatsu did not lead development of two important early 
sectors, cotton spinning and railways, which due to their scale required funding from 
                                                        
2 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. 12-14;  Fruin, Japanese Enterprise, pp. 3-5. 
3 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness. 
4 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. xvii.  While the direct translation of zaibatsu is ``financial 
clique,’’ they are more commonly known as ``business groups’’ in existing literature; 
see Morck and Nakamura, ``Business groups.’’ 
issued stock.5 Evidence of zaibatsu leadership in developing new industries is also 
underwhelming: new data indicate that of the 109 privately started industries in the 
Meiji Period, only 12 were pioneered by zaibatsu. Other scholars claim that these 
conglomerates owed their pathbreaking efforts to government patronage, not to their 
own merits or intrinsic qualities.6  More recent work suggests zaibatsu employed 
few university graduates during the Meiji Period and lagged their competitors in 
using new technology thereafter.7  
robability of introducing ne
                                                       
Notwithstanding these concerns, the visibility of zaibatsu has generated a 
substantial body of research. Common to countries at an early stage of development, 
``[Japan] lacked the basic commercial and financial infrastructure and the technical 
and managerial skills essential to introduce and operate Western industrial 
technology.''8   Consequently, numerous studies have asserted that zaibatsu led the 
introduction and use of foreign technology in Japan's early period of 
industrialization, although these claims are supported mainly by anecdote, case 
studies, or cross-country comparisons.  The few papers that use quantitative data to 
compare zaibatsu behavior to other firms are limited to financial records dating 
primarily from the Taisho Period (1912-1926), leaving what occurred in prior years 
unclear.  
This paper attempts to fill in some of these gaps, particularly on the issues of 
industrial and technological leadership. I test whether characteristics typical of 
zaibatsu increase the likelihood of being an industry pioneer, and thus gauge how 
important these business groups were to technological adoption in Meiji Japan.  
These features include industry diversification and concentrated private ownership, 
and I further control for industry type and technological innovation.9 My main 
finding is that both diversification and private ownership significantly affect a firm’s 
p w production technology.  This is consistent with 
 
5 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. 27. 
6 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. 23; Nakagawa, ``Business strategy,'' pp. 2-12. 
7 Frankl, ``Analysis,'' p. 1001. 
8 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. x. 
9 A third common feature among zaibatsu is the substantial wealth held by their 
founding families, but this information is not publicly available and thus omitted 
from the analysis.  Nevertheless, some specifications include an indicator for 
zaibatsu affiliation in addition to private ownership and diversification to proxy for 
this characteristic. 
studies averring that diversification allows firms to take greater risks in their 
investments and subsidizes costs using revenues from existing operations and 
retained earnings.  Private ownership also provides flexibility in financial choices 
and a potentially longer investment horizon.  In the absence of developed financial 
markets, these features may have given zaibatsu the edge over smaller independent 
firms in leading technology adoption.10 
Ironically, I also find that there is an optimal level of diversification, beyond 
which the probability of pioneering an industry decreases relative to less diversified 
firms. One explanation is that the administrative costs and managerial difficulties of 
entering, much less pioneering, new sectors begin to outweigh the benefits of risk 
sharing. Specifically, I find that highly diversified firms are less likely to pioneer 
additional industries as early as the 1880s, even in innovative sectors where their 
advantages are more pronounced.  This behavioral change corroborates other 
research that shows Meiji-era zaibatsu lagging behind technologically independent 
firms and newer conglomerates in the Taisho and early Showa (1926-1989) 
Periods.11  
At the heart of the analysis is the assumption that the timing of an industry's 
initial appearance approximates when its production technology was introduced to 
Japan.  As a latecomer to industrialization, Japan could borrow existing technologies 
without needing to develop them itself.  Thus, it seems reasonable to consider the 
first Japanese firm in a new sector as the first adopter of the technology, with all the 
associated costs and risks.  By extension, determining whether zaibatsu 
characteristics correspond to those of industry pioneers provides a way to evaluate 
claims of their purported leadership and to assess what specifically may have 
contributed to their early leadership in Japanese development. 
A consequence of the ``first appearance, first adoption'' assumption is that my 
analysis eschews the need for financial records, few of which existed before the 
twentieth century.  Instead, I develop a new establishment-level dataset from the 
Meiji Period, which I gathered from corporate genealogies.  These genealogies 
arguably comprise the oldest source of firm information across industries for Japan. 
                                                        
10 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. 93-94. 
11 Frankl, ``Analysis,'' p. 1001. 
By focusing on the Meiji Period, when Japan began to industrialize, I avoid drawing 
anachronistic conclusions that use more detailed documentation from later years.  
Furthermore, I circumvent the distortions associated with the global depression in 
the 1920s and militarization in the 1930s.  
  Other departures from existing research include looking at specific features 
of Meiji-era zaibatsu, as opposed to individual zaibatsu, and using a cross-section of 
industries in the economy. Given that discussions of Japanese industrial 
development refer to zaibatsu collectively, it makes sense to weigh the importance of 
their shared features like family ownership and diversification.  Similarly, 
considering a wide range of industries allows one to compare differences in factor 




As a late developing economy with immature financial and legal institutions, 
Meiji Japan seems to provide an ideal context for zaibatsu-led industrialization. In 
particular, given the need for capital mobilization and broad-based development, 
zaibatsu attributes like diversified holdings, internal financing, family wealth and 
ownership, and access to natural resources and skilled labor would be highly 
advantageous. Before World War II, these features allowed zaibatsu to import 
physical capital and technology from abroad; employ skilled foreigners and 
graduates from newly established Japanese universities; and expand into new 
markets.13 Independent firms, on the other hand, were typically under-capitalized 
due a wealthy merchant class reluctant to invest in unfamiliar technology; high 
dividend payments that left little retained earnings for expansion; and weak capital 
markets plagued with ill-defined property rights and high barriers to equity 
finance.14 
Nevertheless, some scholarship disputes these factors as motivating zaibatsu 
leadership and suggests these conglomerates emerged only through government 
                                                        
12 See Morck and Nakamura, ``Business groups.’’ 
13 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. xvii-xxiv; Fruin, Japanese Enterprise, pp. 3-5. 
14 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. 4, 57, 93-94. 
assistance.15 Throughout this period, the government sponsored study trips and 
foreign employment; invested in roads, telegraphs, utilities and transport facilities; 
and subsidized strategic sectors like shipping, construction, armaments, and mining, 
all which tended to benefit zaibatsu given their fields of operation and international 
exposure. More controversial were the personal relationships between zaibatsu 
families and government officials, with zaibatsu allegedly receiving preferential 
treatment in contracts and the privatization of public enterprises during the 1880s.   
Proponents of this perspective, however, also find it difficult to substantiate 
their claims, such as identifying the direction of causality or demonstrating that 
zaibatsu received benefits disproportionate to the risks involved.  For example, 
Mitsui claims it invested in industries like coal mining, textiles, and machinery 
because of their anticipated importance to economic growth and potential 
profitability.16 Whether government-zaibatsu relationships on balance benefited the 
latter is questionable, considering that some came close to bankruptcy due to 
changes in political administration or public pressure for competition.17 Many 
zaibatsu also emerged with no official patronage, having been established well 
before the Meiji Period or operating in trades that received little public investment, 
and their purchase of state assets below book value may have had less to do with 
favoritism and more with government haste to staunch continued losses.  More 
generally, public goods like education and infrastructure are non-excludable and 
thus were available to both zaibatsu and independent entrepreneurs.  Finally, 
others note that Japan's takeoff occurred toward the end of the century, post-dating 
most of the government's industrial activities.18  
Similarly, research comparing the performance of zaibatsu to other private 
firms finds mixed evidence supporting zaibatsu technological leadership.  Jennifer 
Frankl, using financial records for 130 firms between 1915 and 1937, analyzes the 
effect of zaibatsu affiliation on equity returns and risk profiles.  She finds that Meiji-
era zaibatsu had more volatile returns on equity than its competitors.19    In 
                                                        
15 Nakagawa, ``Business strategy,'' pp. 3-12. 
16 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. 66. 
17 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. 20-26. 
18 Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, p. 20. 
19 Frankl, ``Analysis,'' p. 1012. 
addition, these zaibatsu were slow to adopt new technology and to expand into new 
industries and markets.  Two other studies, in contrast, find the average zaibatsu 
outperforming independent firms and having less volatile returns, which the 
authors attribute to concentrated ownership and the holding company structure.20 
The discrepancy in findings partly depends on whether a study distinguishes 
Meiji-era zaibatsu from newer ones, something Frankl does and the others do not.  
Yet it may be the case that none of these studies apply to an earlier period with 
different institutional and market conditions, and that the designation of zaibatsu is 
itself endogenously determined based on their continued success and non-market 
considerations. Another concern recognized by the authors is that using records from 
a modest sample of large firms introduces bias to the results and overlooks 
contributions from smaller or non-traded firms.21 Since the latter may not have been 
required to document their finances, results excluding them may not generalize for 
the whole of the economy.  Thus, a more representative firm-level dataset across the 
industrial spectrum from the Meiji Period would help to clarify the role of zaibatsu 
in industry formation and innovation. 
 
III 
A problem common to historical studies of economic development is the lack 
of data.  Few developing countries have the capacity to create and maintain detailed 
information on industries and firms, and Japan in the nineteenth century was no 
exception.  Even historic data in the Long Term Economic Statistics of Japan 
document industrial development beginning in 1887 and only available at the 
national level.22 Nevertheless, potentially valuable information may be found in an 
overlooked resource: corporate genealogies, which track firms from their origins to 
modern times.  In particular, genealogies provide dates of establishment, ownership 
and source of setup finance, industry classification, and geographic location.  Despite 
being less quantitative than financial reports, these data can be used to assess 
relationships between firms and sectors while controlling for the abovementioned 
characterist antly, they often represent the oldest reliable evidence ics.  More import
                                                        
20 Miyajima et al, ``Corporate governance''; Okazaki, ``Role.'' 
21 Frankl, ``Analysis,'' p. 1003. 
22 Ohkawa, Nihon. 
of firm activity across the industrial spectrum.  I use as my primary data source for 
this study the Shuyo Kigyo no Keifuzu, a compilation of corporate genealogies edited 
by the business historians Shintaro Yagura and Yoshiro Ikushima. Additional data 
include firm financial reports from the Eigyo Hokokusho Shusei} collection and 
various Japanese industry indices and firm case studies.23  
The Shuyo compilation includes genealogies for 1,089 firms that were listed 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of September 1984, contain over 14,000 unique 
establishment observations, and date back to the early nineteenth century or earlier. 
One concern to using genealogies is that they do not represent a random sample of 
business activity because of firm survivor bias, meaning that they contain only 
establishments that survived long enough to be recorded. This bias is partly 
mitigated in the Shuyo because the genealogies explicitly identify asset transfers 
from bankrupt or merged establishments to successful ones.  Thus, despite firm 
failure or reorganization, both surviving and deceased firms remain on record.  The 
authors also cross-reference establishments that appear in multiple genealogies and 
track the ancestry of failed establishments, providing a way to verify a firm's startup 
status.  The inclusion of failed establishments is particularly relevant in 
manufacturing sectors since they typically leave behind transferable assets, unlike 
firms in some service industries that require little capital investment or equipment. 
Figure 1 shows the number of startup establishments over the Meiji Period. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Industries can be identified through the company name or editorial 
annotation, and I retroactively apply industry codes to each observation using the 
1984 edition of the Standard Industrial Classification for Japan (JSIC) produced by 
the Statistics Bureau of Japan. The Japanese SIC system resembles the United 
States SIC system (replaced in 1997 with the North American Industry 
Classification System), but is not a one-to-one mapping.  Like its American 
ystem classifies industries hierarchically, from broader counterparts, the Japanese s
                                                        
23 See Yushodo, Eigyo; Asia Research, Outline; Dodwell, Industrial Groupings; 
Mitsubishi Public Affairs Committee, Brief History; Ohsono, Charting; and Russell, 
House of Mitsui. 
industry groups (two-digits) to narrow ones (four-digits).  For example, a two-digit 
code of 05 refers to Metal Mining; a three-digit code of 053 refers to Iron Ore Mining; 
and a four-digit code of 0534 refers to Chromium (a type of iron ore) Mining.  
Typically, company names in Japan have three parts: personal/geographic 
name + industrial activity + industrial operation/facility (for example, Ishitsuka + 
Bottle Manufacturing + Factory), although there are many that use a combination of 
only the first two identifiers.  There are also some exceptions to the single-industry-
per-establishment identification, excluding conglomerates.  For example, Kotahara 
Coach and Rail is classified in both the Local Railway (JSIC four-digit code 4021) 
and Light Passenger Vehicle Transport (JSIC4 4141) industries. For establishments 
without any industry indicator in the genealogies, which represent less than ten 
percent of the sample, I search for Japanese firm names in electronic databases as 
well as industry reports. 
 
IV 
For my analysis, I use a maximum likelihood probit model to estimate 
relative likelihoods of first entry.  That is, I set the entry outcome (first entry or not) 
as my dichotomous dependent variable.  My main independent variables include a 
continuous measure of how diversified a firm is (eg, the number of industries a firm 
operates in at the time of entry) and an indicator for ownership type (ie, publicly 
traded or private-held), both considered essential differences between zaibatsu and 
independent firms. Other differences like family wealth, employment of highly 
skilled labor, access to natural resources, and relationships with the central 
government are not identifiable with existing data. However, to address this possible 
omitted variable bias, I use both a specification test and variable decomposition as 
described in the next section.  To capture the decreasing marginal benefit of 
diversification, I include the square of the firm's number of industries.  I also use an 
indicator for technological innovation, which considers whether an industry uses 
technology that is new to the domestic market or is similar to an existing industry.  
In addition to interaction terms between each of these variables, I account for factors 
like regulatory change, market demand, and industry preferences with time and 
industry group dummy variables.  The estimated equation takes the following form: 
 
Pr(Y=1) = Φ (Xi βi + Xj βj + Xk βk + Xt βt), where 
Y = JSIC four-digit industry pioneer 
Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function 
Xi = firm-level variables (diversification, ownership) 
Xj = industry-level variables (innovativeness, JSIC2 indicators) 
Xk = interaction terms among Xi and Xj 
Xt = five-year indicator variables 
 
Industry diversification, measured in the number of industries a firm is 
already in at the time of establishment in a new industry, appears twice in the 
estimation.  By definition, a conglomerate is a multi-sector firm; however, 
independent firms that simultaneously enter multiple industries at the time of 
establishment can be considered diversified as well.  This variable increases in 
magnitude for each zaibatsu over the Meiji Period.  Since diversifying across 
industries reduces volatility in revenues and spreads industry-specific risk, it is 
reasonable to expect diversified firms being more likely to lead entry in new sectors.   
On the other hand, having many different industry holdings, especially in 
technologically advanced and capital-intensive sectors, poses organizational and 
strategic challenges and may deter further diversification.  This was the case in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before multi-divisional enterprises and 
professional management became the norm.24 In other words, synergies may exist 
between certain firms and industries but not for others, and there may be an 
optimal number of industries for a single firm to operate in, beyond which the costs 
of multiple holdings exceed the benefits.  Some examples include disputes between 
the directors of the Mitsui trading company and Mitsui bank over investment 
strategy and irrational investment choices by the founder of the Furukawa 
zaibatsu.25 I account for this decreasing marginal benefit by separately including the 
square of the diversification variable. 
The variable for firm ownership type takes the value of one for publicly-
traded, joint-stock firms or zero for privately-held, non-traded firms. Since one 
                                                        
24 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. 23, 113. 
25 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, pp. 66, 74. 
prominent characteristic of zaibatsu is their family ownership, this variable may 
indicate their desire for investment autonomy and to avoid public disclosure of their 
finances.26  That said, many zaibatsu held controlling interests in publicly-traded 
firms and there were independent non-traded firms, so this variable only partly 
captures the difference between zaibatsu and non-zaibatsu firms.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that equity-financed firms, unlike those with internal or debt-
based financing, were small and undercapitalized by their need to pay dividends. 
Moreover, many listed firms were run for short-term profit and were incorporated 
for a predetermined time period, between three to ten years.27  I hypothesize that 
non-traded, private ownership allows a firm to make riskier, long-term investments 
such as leading entry into new industries since financing was less subject to 
business cycle volatility and investor impatience.   
This ownership variable also addresses the issue of corporate monitoring 
through holding companies, which was important in both the pre- and postwar eras. 
Prior to the adoption of the 1893 Commercial Code, which standardized 
incorporation procedures and defined fiduciary responsibilities, the limited ability of 
outside investors to monitor management and dominant owners may have hindered 
the public listing of firms. Although incorporation existed since the 1860s, the lack of 
institutions governing business practice or protecting property rights remained until 
the 1890s. Thus, these two factors also suggest a positive correlation between non-
traded ownership and first entry. 
The rationale for focusing on industry innovativeness is that pioneering 
sectors that use technologies similar to those already in the market incurs less entry 
risk and demonstrates less leadership.  This is because another firm had already 
borne the cost of foreign adoption, which presumably is more than adapting 
technology from a domestic source.  Firms using derivative technology are also 
aware of how the original has been received by the market and some of its 
operational difficulties. I differentiate between these two types of industry 
pioneering with an indicator variable for technology innovativeness. It takes a value 
of one for an industry that is the first to be established out of its broader industry 
                                                        
26 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. 43. 
27 Fruin, Japanese Enterprise. 
grouping, and zero for industries that are not.  An example of this is the three-digit 
industry grouping ``251: Glass Manufacturing,'' which includes the related four-digit 
industries of ``2511: Plate Glass,'' ``2514: Glass Container,'' and ``2515: Scientific 
Glassware.''  If there were no glass manufacturing industries prior to 1871, when the 
Ishitsuka Bottle Manufacturing Factory was founded, then only the four-digit 
industry ``2514'' would be coded as innovative.  Based on zaibatsu advantages and 
the claim that, ceteris paribus, Japanese entrepreneurs were ``reluctant to invest in 
modern industries in which they lacked experience,'' I expect the interaction 
between zaibatsu and innovativeness to be positive.28  
The weakness of private capital and lack of robust financial intermediaries 
suggest problems mobilizing investment funding for capital-intensive industries, 
and play to the advantages of zaibatsu affiliation.  However, since no data exist to 
quantitatively measure the capital intensity of Japanese industries during this 
period, I use major industry dummies to account for inter-industry differences and 
cluster standard errors by four-digit industry to control for random industry shocks.  
To identify shared influences, I interact pairs of the following independent variables: 
zaibatsu affiliation, diversification, diversification2, ownership, and industry 
innovativeness. I also include five-year period indicator variables to capture short- to 
medium-term temporal shocks to institutions and market conditions.   
As for exclusions, I remove government firms from the sample on the grounds 
that the behavior of such firms is not obviously driven by market factors.  I also 
remove all sectors that were established prior to the Meiji Period since they are less 
well-documented and unlikely to use technology borrowed from abroad; these 
include primary sector activities, traditional apparel/food manufacture, retailing, 
and other miscellaneous services. For duplicate appearances in the dataset due to 
changes in name or ownership, only the first appearance is included in the analysis.  
Establishments in foreign countries are omitted as well.  These exclusions reduce 
the number of zaibatsu affiliates from 89 to 32 in the dataset, and I omit the 173 




28 Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p. 4. 
V 
Between 1868 and 1912, 1,958 entrants could be identified by a four-digit 
JSIC code. Entrants include both individual firms as well as industry divisions 
within multi-industry companies (for example, conglomerates). With the restrictions 
mentioned above, the dataset reduces to 1,478 entrants, of which 1,446 were 
independent firms and 32 were affiliated with zaibatsu.  Of the 109 new industries 
started with private funding, 12 were pioneered by zaibatsu and 97 by independent 
entrepreneurs. Additional summary statistics are in Table 1, which shows 
breakdowns by firm affiliation for various firm- and industry-level characteristics 
and the numbers of industry pioneers in parentheses. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
The large disparity between the absolute number of independent and 
zaibatsu establishments belies substantial behavioral and organizational differences 
at the industry level.  For example, zaibatsu are disproportionately represented in 
innovative industries (75 percent of establishments) compared to independent firms 
(23 percent).  As expected, zaibatsu are nearly ten times as diversified as 
independent firms and more likely to have closed, privately-held ownership.  Pair-
wise correlations in Table 2 are largely consistent with the summary statistics.  As 
hypothesized, first entry is positively correlated with diversification, private 
ownership, and zaibatsu affiliation in general.  Zaibatsu are positively correlated 
with diversification, closed ownership, and both innovative and heavy industries.29  
  
[Table 3 here] 
 
However, as mentioned earlier, it may be more interesting to know why 
zaibatsu were able to lead the adoption of new technology than simply whether they 
 account for multiple shared features, I use a probit were more likely to do so.  To
                                                        
29 Heavy industries include chemicals, machinery, metal processing, and utilities, 
while light sectors include food processing, ceramics and glass, paper and wood 
products, textiles, and miscellaneous manufactures.  The remainder are grouped 
together as non-manufacturing sectors.  See Rosovsky, Capital Formation, p. 29.   
model to identify contributions from individual characteristics.  Results from the 
regressions are given in Table 3, and suggest that features associated with zaibatsu 
increase the likelihood of industry first entry as hypothesized.  To ease 
interpretation, coefficients are reported as marginal effects, which measure the 
change in probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous variables and a 
discrete change in categorical variables.  Thus, the specification in column 1 shows 
that a firm with operations in another industry (row 1) increases the probability of 
industry first entry by 3 percent and that a privately-held firm is 18 percent more 
likely to pioneer an industry compared to a publicly-traded one.  I control for data 
heteroskedasticity by estimating and reporting Eicker-White standard errors, which 
are clustered by four-digit industry to account for industry-specific shocks. 
Column 2 includes the interactions between the firm-level variables in 
column 1, and column 3 adds industry innovativeness and its interactions. Doing so 
shows that a firm’s degree of diversification conveys an advantage to leading entry 
only in non-innovative industries, with single and multi-sector firms having 
comparable probabilities of pioneering an innovative industry.  Columns 4 and 5 add 
indicator variables for major industry groups and five-year intervals, respectively.  
These help to reduce biases owing to differences between types of industries and 
changes in economic environment.  The coefficients in these columns are 
qualitatively similar to the earlier ones, suggesting that the net effect of 
diversification to the likelihood of industry first entry up is positive and that the 
effect is stronger in non-innovative sectors. For all the specifications, being a 
private, non-traded firm increases the chances of industry pioneering by a smaller 
(but statistically significant) amount. 
To consider the cumulative effect of all control variables, I calculate 
probabilities based on the features of a representative Meiji-era zaibatsu (privately-
held, ten industries) and a contemporaneous unaffiliated firm (joint-stock, single 
sector). Accounting for all statistically significant variables in column 4, a typical 
zaibatsu is 70 percent more likely to lead entry into an innovative sector compared 
to its independent rival and 51 percent more likely to pioneer a non-innovative 
industry.  These percentages obtain from taking the difference in first entry 
probabilities for the reference zaibatsu and independent firm, with a positive 
number indicating a higher relative likelihood for zaibatsu. 
With time dummies (column 5), the findings reveal subtle, but substantive 
differences.  While diversification continues to aid expansion into non-innovative 
sectors, it has the opposite effect for entry into innovative ones. Furthermore, being 
both highly diversified and privately-held reduce the likelihood of pioneering an 
industry.  The difference between first entry probabilities for a typical zaibatsu and 
independent firm in an innovative industry is –15 percent (independent advantage); 
for a non-innovative industry, the difference is 40 percent (zaibatsu advantage). 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
These oppositely-sign likelihoods, with zaibatsu favoring non-innovative 
sectors and independent firms innovative ones, are graphically shown in Figure 2, 
where I substitute actual zaibatsu diversification over time in calculated 
probabilities. The relative likelihood of zaibatsu in pioneering a non-innovative 
industry remains comfortably positive and increases through the turn of the 
century.  This is in contrast to its entry advantage in innovative sectors, which is 
negligible even early in the period and falls below that for an independent firm in 
1876, when average zaibatsu diversification was around six industries. While it 
would be heroic to rely on this year estimate, the trends suggest that zaibatsu may 
have lost their technological leadership with regard to industry entry earlier than 
previously suspected.30 
To check whether the model is correctly specified, I use a Wald test of 
significance to see if the coefficients are jointly different from zero.  All specifications 
pass at the one percent level of significance.  I also test for functional form and 
omitted variable bias with a specification link test. This test takes the fitted values 
of the residual from the original regression, squares them, and reinserts them into 
the model as an additional variable.  The modified model is estimated to check for 
significance in the new variable.  The null is that the model has no omitted 
variables, and if correctly specified, the squares of the residuals should not be 
significant (since they would not show a pattern that could be explained with 
  A significance level above five percent is generally additional control variables).
                                                        
30 Frankl, ``Analysis,'' p. 1001. 
interpreted as failure to reject the hypothesis (in other words, model is not 
incorrectly specified). All specifications are above this threshold, which means that 
the null hypothesis of no omitted variables cannot be rejected.   
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
How robust are these results, especially considering differences over time and 
in firm characteristics?  To test the prediction that zaibatsu lose their first entry 
advantage later in the period, I take subsets of the data after various threshold 
years and rerun the column 5 specification in Table 3.  For instance, in column A of 
Table 4, I use only establishments in new industries dating from 1876, when a 
representative zaibatsu is expected to retain its first entry advantage for non-
innovative industries, but not for innovative ones.  This appears to be the case, as 
the variables for diversification and private ownership continue to increase the 
probability of industry pioneering, but not when interacted with the variable for 
industry innovativeness.   
By the end of the 1880s, however, zaibatsu appear to have no first entry 
advantage in any industry over their independent rivals.  Column B contains the 
results for the sample of industries started after 1888, which marks the year by 
which most state-owned enterprises were privatized.31  As mentioned earlier, there 
is some controversy in whether government favoritism to zaibatsu provided the 
impetus for their industrial leadership.  Notwithstanding this paper’s exclusion of 
firms established by the government so as to identify only private sector activity, the 
privatization program may have affected contemporaneous zaibatsu expansion into 
other sectors.  I find that after the 1880s zaibatsu are statistically indistinguishable 
from their independent rivals in the probability of pioneering an industry.   
Similar results, shown in column C, obtain for the set of new industries 
started on or after 1893, when the government promulgated a new Commercial 
Code.  Considered a significant milestone for Japanese investors and financial 
markets, the code provided a legal framework to protect property rights; thus, 
d it easier to finance investments externally, offsetting entrepreneurs may have foun
                                                        
31 Morck and Nakamura, ``Business groups,’’ Table 1. 
the internal financing advantage of zaibatsu. This appears to be the case as none of 
the features associated with zaibatsu significantly affects the probability of first 
entry for this sample of industries. 
How much of the first entry advantage can be attributed to diversification 
and ownership as opposed to differences in the distributions of these variables 
between zaibatsu and independent firms?  A common method used to isolate 
individual contributions between two groups is via Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, 
which uses a single set of coefficient estimates in separate regressions for both group 
subsamples.32  Taking the difference between the two resulting predictions for each 
variable allows one to attribute the percentage that can be explained solely by that 
variable uncontaminated by group distributional dissimilarities.  The Fairlie 
decomposition extends this methodology to nonlinear estimation, which I use to 
obtain the results in columns D through F.33 
To calculate variable contribution, I use coefficients estimated from the 
pooled sample of zaibatsu and independent firms and match pairs of observations 
from the two groups.34  Given the smaller number of zaibatsu firms, I take 1,000 
random samples of 32 independent firms to match with the zaibatsu observations 
and report the average from these samples.  To ease interpretation and obtain 
meaningful estimates from each firm group, I do not include interaction terms in the 
probit regression; otherwise, the specification is the same as that in column 5 from 
Table 3.   
As shown in row 12 of column D, the difference in predicted first entry 
likelihoods between the two firm groups is 0.306, of which the included control 
variables explain 0.284  (or 93 percent).  In particular, the net effect of 
diversification explains 0.139 (45 percent) of the total difference while non-traded 
ownership explains 0.054 (18 percent).  Since the individually calculated differences 
are sensitive to the order of variables in the specification, I randomize all the 
independent variables to obtain the estimates given in column E, which are 
                                                        
32 See Blinder, ``Wage discrimination’’ and Oaxaca, ``Male-female wage.’’ 
33 See Fairlie, ``The absence.’’ 
34 The choice of which set of coefficients (ie, group A , B, or pooled) is arbitrary.  I use 
coefficients from the pooled sample to maximize sample size; estimates derived from 
coefficients of the independent firm sample are qualitatively similar.   
qualitatively similar to those in the previous column.  Finally, instead of assuming a 
normal distribution for the data, I substitute a logit model for the probit, and obtain 
comparable results, shown in column F.  Altogether, the Fairlie decomposition 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that zaibatsu possessed characteristics 
that appear to facilitate first entry into new industries. 
 
VI 
One interpretive concern is that while zaibatsu may have been more likely to 
lead entry, their absolute number of first entrants is small, bringing into question 
their overall impact.  This observation assumes that zaibatsu and independent firms 
were similar when in all probability a single zaibatsu affiliate was much larger and 
more productive.  Since this paper employs qualitative measures of industrial 
activity, it does not directly address this point.  Nevertheless, as listed in the 
appendix, many industries that zaibatsu pioneered were capital-intensive or large 
scale, and thus out of reach for most independent investors.  These industries may 
also have been important for production in other sectors (for example, metal mining 
for machine manufacture), providing an alternative means for zaibatsu to lead 
industrialization even with large establishment numbers or even first entry.  That 
said, given the relatively meager number of firms and industries used in earlier 
studies for this time period, one of the strengths of the current dataset is its 
inclusion of independent firms that would otherwise have no record, thus reducing 
some sample bias. Furthermore, while it may be heroic to use these data for reliable 
point estimates of variable effects, they nevertheless serve the purpose of comparing 
firm activity and technology adoption via qualitative measures like entry and 
industry formation. 
Although the main finding of this paper supports the view that zaibatsu 
assisted the development of industry, it also disputes the notion that they were 
necessarily vanguards of innovation and suggests a loss of leadership over time.  
What accounts for these seemingly important omissions in earlier research?  Besides 
data unavailability, an additional explanation may lie in the emphasis on firm 
characteristics as opposed to industry-level determinants of performance, and 
inductive reasoning based on case studies. This paper itself leads with stylized facts 
about zaibatsu's preponderant size and resource access that were deemed critical to 
innovation and industrial expansion.  These identifying features, however, may be 
anachronistic and misleading.  As mentioned in the introduction, zaibatsu were less 
able to attain scale economies because their holdings were so diverse.  This applied 
especially to those zaibatsu that began in trading, shipping, and finance.  Thus, 
additional study of inter-industry synergies and their degree of relatedness for firms 
in the Meiji Period may better identify firm behavior and industry activity by the 
stage of development. 
Similarly, interfirm linkages may have been a way for independent 
entrepreneurs to combat conglomerate dominance or to overcome capital market 
deficiencies.  This was the case in postwar Japan, where independent firms unable 
to internalize transaction costs through merger used networks to increase efficiency. 
This scenario may have applied to prewar Japan as well, and could be explored by 
expanding the current dataset into panel form.  A panel dataset providing dates of 
ownership change or reorganization may also be useful for studying firm longevity in 
the Meiji Period, complementing this paper's focus on firm establishment.  This 
would complement the emerging literature on determinants of firm survival (eg, 
productivity differences, trade) by including the experience of firms in developing 
economies as well as a historical perspective.  
This paper also remains silent on two important influences: government and 
trade.  Among other policies, the government sponsored model factories at the 
beginning of the Meiji Period to jump-start industrialization.  As mentioned above, it 
later privatized these enterprises (with many purchased by zaibatsu) and indirectly 
supported industry through subsidies and contracts.  A major impediment to 
assessing the government's contribution is the difficulty in disentangling direct and 
indirect support. Nevertheless, it may be possible to use this dataset to explore the 
evolution of sectors started by either the government or the private sector, 
comparing characteristics like rate of entry or factor intensity. One can then better 
judge the efficacy of state initiative during early economic development. 
Not to be neglected is the international context in which Japan 
industrialized, considering that its rapid growth relied on technology imports and 
commodity exports. Using commodity trade flow and Meiji firm establishment data, 
one may be able to gauge the importance of trade by comparing industry growth 
rates based on export shares.  This relationship may also help to explain the 
remarkable resilience of traditional sectors that grew in tandem with the country's 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 All Estab. Zaibatsu Unaffiliated 
  (1st entries) (1st entries) 
 
New JSIC4 industries 1,478 32 (12) 1,446 (97) 
 Innovative industries     341 24 (8)    317 (46) 
Average diversification per firm    9.8        1.0 
Firm ownership 
 Joint-stock 1,018   6 (2) 1,012 (48) 
 Non-traded     166 26 (10)    140 (32) 
Establishments by capital intensity 
 Light    145   0 (0)    145 (31) 
 Heavy    103   8 (6)      95 (35) 
 Non-manufacturing 1,230 24 (6) 1,206 (31) 
 








Table 2: Correlations 
 
 FIRST DIV. NONTR. ZAIB. INNOV. HEAVY 
 
First entry       1 
Diversification  0.179*       1 
Non-traded firm  0.264*  0.261*       1 
Zaibatsu affiliation  0.172*  0.829*  0.323*       1 
Innovative JSIC4  0.200*  0.190*  0.161*  0.183*       1 
Heavy sector  0.355*  0.174*  0.190*  0.105*  0.214*       1 
Light sector  0.187* -0.046  0.167* -0.049  0.348* -0.098*  
 
Significance level:  *5 percent 
Source:  see text 
Table 3: Probit Results 
 
Dependent variable: Pr(Y=1st entry) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Diversification   0.031**   0.064*   0.197***   0.077**   0.042* 
 (0.012) (0.034) (0.080) (0.045) (0.030) 
 
Diversification2 -0.002** -0.005 -0.028** -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) 
 
Non-traded firm   0.181***   0.193***   0.018***   0.070***   0.028 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.096) (0.048) (0.033) 
 
Innovative industry     0.071 -0.023 -0.031** 
   (0.050) (0.021) (0.018) 
Interaction terms 
 Diversification ⋅ Non-traded  -0.043 -0.008   0.025 0.031* 
   (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023) 
 
 Diversification ⋅ Innovative   -0.187*** -0.093** -0.061*** 
    (0.090) (0.053) (0.037) 
 
 Diversification2 ⋅ Non-traded    0.003 -0.000 -0.003* -0.003** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
 Diversification2 ⋅ Innovative     0.028***   0.013* 0.007 
    (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) 
 
 Non-traded ⋅ Innovative   -0.019 -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.035) (0.024) (0.021) 
 
Industry fixed effects    included included 
 
Time fixed effects     included 
 
Observations   1,184   1,184   1,184   1,184   1,184 
 
Pseudo-R2   0.108   0.112   0.158   0.325   0.406 
 
Significance level:  *10 percent **5 percent ***1 percent 
Notes: Results reported as marginal effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by 4-digit industry. 
Source: see text 
 
Table 4: Robustness Checks 
 
Dependent variable: Pr(Y=1st entry) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 
Diversification   0.414***   0.366   0.209   0.262***   0.304***  0.253*** 
 (0.128) (0.271) (0.246) (0.087)  (0.117) (0.088) 
 
Diversification2 -0.153***   0.002   0.002 -0.123*** -0.198*** -0.119*** 
 (0.054) (0.006) (0.006) (0.036) (0.074)  (0.042) 
 
Non-traded firm   0.181**   0.044 -0.134   0.054*   0.039  0.055* 
 (0.102) (0.158) (0.149) (0.030) (0.024)  (0.030) 
 
Innovative industry -0.099   0.110 -0.054 -0.086** -0.052** -0.095*** 
 (0.073) (0.182) (0.185) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.033) 
Interaction terms 
 Diversification ⋅ Non-traded -0.274*   0.018   0.040     
  (0.137) (0.554) (0.376)   
 
 Diversification ⋅ Innovative -0.122 -0.391 -0.265   
  (0.120) (0.542) (0.256)   
 
 Diversification2 ⋅ Non-traded 0.153*** dropped dropped   
  (0.053)     
 
 Diversification2 ⋅ Innovative dropped dropped dropped   
       
 
 Non-traded ⋅ Innovative -0.062 -0.057   0.144   
  (0.063) (0.283) (0.270)   
 
Industry fixed effects included included included included included included 
 
Time fixed effects ≥1876 ≥1889 ≥1893 included included included 
 
Explained contribution/Difference    0.284/0.306 0.284/0.306 0.275/0.306 
 
Observations   416   114    99   1,184   1,184   1,184 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.316 0.142 0.180   0.389   0.389   0.391 
 
Significance level:  *10 percent **5 percent ***1 percent 
Notes: Results in columns A to C reported as marginal effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by 4-digit 
industry. Results in columns D to F based on contributions averaged from 1,000 random samples, with standard errors in 
parentheses and calculated using the delta method. 
Source: see text 
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Appendix: List of New Industries in Meiji Period 
 
Industry Name JSIC4 Year 
Coal mining   611*^ 1868 
Cotton/spun rayon fabric weaving 1441*^ 1868 
Beer 1322 1869 
Foreign exchange bank 6124* 1869 
Joint-stock life insurance company 6711* 1869 
Machine-reeled raw silk 1411* 1870 
Glass containers 2514* 1871 
Valves and fittings 2992^ 1871 
Fabricated pipe and fittings 2993^ 1871 
Ball and roller bearings 2994^ 1871 
 
Piston rings 2995*^ 1871 
Mold and dies, parts, and accessories 2996^ 1871 
Coastwise freight transport 4323*^^ 1871 
National railway 4011*^ 1872 
Postal services 4711* 1872 
Water supply installation, draining work 1133* 1873 
Cement 2521*^ 1873 
Ocean transport 4311^^ 1873 
Ordinary bank 6121^^ 1873 
Fired bricks 2551* 1875 
 
Foreign style paper 1821 1876 
Food processing machinery 2961*^ 1876 
General civil engineering, building works   911* 1877 
Other silk reeling plant 1419^ 1877 
Construction and mining machinery 2931*^ 1877 
Spinning machinery 2951*^ 1877 
Wood working machinery 2962^ 1877 
Wool spinning mill 1423*^ 1878 
Rice cleaning 1261 1879 
Wheat flour 1263*^ 1879 
 
Nitric, phosporitic fertilizers 2011* 1879 
Credit cooperative association 6313* 1879 
Joint-stock fire/marine insurance company 6721*^^ 1879 
Flat glass 2511 1880 
Water supply 3911*^^ 1880 
Overseas loan and investment institution 6142* 1880 
Credit association and related federation 6312^^ 1880 
Merchandise forwarding 4621* 1881 
Commercial and industrial cooperative bank 6314 1881 





Central bank 6111*^ 1882 
Small business finance corporation 6315 1882 
Securities exchange 6631 1882 
Medical product preparations 2062* 1883 
Canned seafood, seaweed 1221* 1884 
Manufactured ice 1341* 1884 
Hemp spinning mill 1425 1884 
Copper smelting and refining, primary 2711*^^ 1884 
Power station 3611* 1884 
Soda bicarbonate 2021* 1885 
 
Dairy products 1212* 1886 
Other paper products 1849 1886 
Matches 3486*^ 1886 
Other electricity establishment 3619 1886 
Lead and zinc metal mining   522*^^ 1887 
Steel pipes and tubes 2644 1887 
Lead pencils 3443* 1887 
Postal order and transfer savings institution 6141^ 1887 
Crude petroleum extraction   711* 1888 
Twisting yarns 1431* 1888 
 
Paints 2054* 1888 
Watches, clocks, and parts, not watchcases 3271* 1888 
Other musical instruments 3429* 1888 
Local railway 4021* 1888 
Light vehicle passenger transport 4141* 1888 
Silk spinning mill 1424 1889 
Building brick 2532* 1889 
Public financial institution for agriculture,  6241*^ 1889 
  forestry, and fishing 
Unrefined sugar 1251 1890 
Soft drinks, carbonated water 1311* 1890 
 
Transport agency 4631* 1890 
Textile sanitary fabric 1498* 1892 
Machine dyed/finished silk, rayon fabrics 1462 1893 
Mutual life insurance company 6712 1894 
Plastics 2037* 1895 
Asbestos mining   892* 1896 
Sugar refining 1252 1896 
Wool fabric weaving 1443 1896 
Printing ink 2055 1896 






Long term credit bank 6123 1896 
Development financial institution 6143 1896 
Agricultural cooperative 6231* 1896 
Canvas products 1593* 1897 
Printing, not mimeograph 1931 1897 
Synthetic dyes, organic pigments 2036 1897 
Petroleum refining 2111* 1897 
Wire drawing 2648 1897 
Coke 2131*^^ 1898 
Aluminum smelting and refining, primary 2716 1899 
 
Trust bank 6122* 1899 
Basic petrol chemicals 2031 1900 
Taxicab operators 4112 1900 
Telephone and telegraph, not broadcast 4721* 1901 
Other industrial organic chemicals 2039 1902 
Motor vehicle bodies and trailers 3112 1896 
Bicycles and parts 3131* 1903 
Metallic springs 2892* 1904 
Power and distribution transformer 3012 1904 
Other stone, sand, gravel quarrying   819* 1905 
 
Compound chemical fertilizers 2012*^^ 1905 
Nails 2871* 1905 
Other metal smelting and refining, 2729*^ 1906 
  secondary 
Electric bulbs 3031 1906 
Sulphur mining   831* 1907 
Distilled alcohol 1324 1907 
Basic livestock feed 1352* 1907 
Leather tanning, finishing 2411* 1907 
Looms, knitting machinery 2952 1907 
Dyeing and finishing machinery 2953 1907 
 
Generators, motors, rotating electrical 3011 1907 
  machinery 
Tramway 4022 1907 
Refrigerated warehousing 4521* 1907 
Fire and marine reinsurance company 6724 1907 
General sawing and planning mill 1611 1908 
Rayon, acetate fiber 2041 1908 
Coating metal products 2862* 1908 
Medical material preparations 2061 1910 
Call loan and bill brokerage, not securities 6411 1909 






Other fabric weaving 1449 1910 
Compressed, liquefied gases 2024 1910 
Soaps and synthetic detergents 2052 1910 
Internal combustion engine 2913*^^ 1910 
Other chemical fertilizer mining   839 1911 
Organic fertilizer 1353 1912 
Other industrial inorganic chemicals 2029 1912 
Fatty acids, hydrogenated oils, glycerin 2051 1912 
Ferro-alloys 2623 1912 
 




: government pioneered 
^: zaibatsu pioneered 
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